



House of Commons
Housing, Communities and
Local Government Committee

Cladding Remediation— Follow-up

Seventh Report of Session 2019–21

*Report, together with formal minutes relating
to the report*

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Housing, Communities and Local Government Committee

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Summary

On 14 June 2017, 72 residents tragically lost their lives in the Grenfell Tower fire. Since then, this Committee has undertaken a range of work focussed on building safety. This report revisits our recent work on cladding remediation, following the Secretary of State's statement on 10 February 2021 on the Government's latest interventions to support the removal of unsafe cladding. These interventions include:

- an additional £3.5 billion towards cladding remediation for high-rise residential buildings 18m and above, on top of £1.6 billion already committed;
- a long-term loan scheme towards the costs of cladding remediation for buildings between 11m and 18m, with a maximum monthly payment of £50 per leaseholder; and
- a new developer levy and a new tax for the UK residential property development sector.

To make homes safe, and to know how long that will take, we need to know how many residential buildings have fire safety defects and what those defects are.

- *We reiterate our recommendation from our June 2020 report that in the same way as it has done for buildings with ACM cladding, the Government should publish a monthly data release on the number of buildings with non-ACM cladding and other serious fire safety defects awaiting remediation. This data release should also explicitly include buildings between 11m and 18m as well as buildings 18m and above.*

We welcome the additional £3.5 billion that the Government has put towards the Building Safety Fund, taking the total to £5.1 billion. The funding, however, does not go far enough. We have previously estimated that the total cost of full remediation works on affected buildings could be up to £15 billion. We also heard about limitations to the Building Safety Fund regarding who is eligible and what the fund can be used for.

- *The Government should establish a Comprehensive Building Safety Fund for full remediation works of affected buildings. In allocating funds from the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, the Government should move away from the current height- and product-based approach and should instead take a holistic, risk- and evidence-based approach that prioritises occupants who are most at risk. To support that approach, the Government should consider establishing a more formal process for identifying and prioritising risk holistically and report back to the Committee on the best way to achieve this, along with the evidence.*
- *We call for a Comprehensive Building Safety Fund that:*
 - *applies to all high-risk buildings of any height, irrespective of tenure;*
 - *covers all fire safety defects, including combustible insulation; and*
 - *covers all associated costs.*

- *The Comprehensive Building Safety Fund should be fully funded by Government and industry, and the Government should establish clear principles regarding how the costs should be split between the two. Total contributions should not be capped.*
- *Social housing providers should have full and equal access to government funds for remediation.*

It has consistently been this Committee's position that leaseholders should not have to contribute towards any of the costs for a problem they played no part in creating.

- **It is disappointing that the Government's proposed loan scheme, whereby leaseholders contribute up to £50 a month to pay for cladding remediation works on buildings between 11m and 18m high, does not satisfy the previously agreed principle that leaseholders should not pay.**
- *The Government should abolish the loan scheme. We reiterate our call on the Government to re-establish the principle that leaseholders should not pay anything towards the cost of remediating historical building safety defects.*

We heard about the wider impacts of the cladding crisis on the private and social housing sectors. We call on the Government to:

- *report back to this Committee with its assessment of the impact of fire safety remediation on the wider housing market; and*
- *carry out and publish an impact assessment on the knock-on effects of fire safety remediation on maintaining existing social homes and building new social homes.*

We have stressed before that this crisis is about more than statistics, costs, and materials. At the heart of this crisis are people: people trapped in unsafe, unsellable homes. After a year in which we have spent more time in our homes than ever before, it is vital that affected residents get the mental health support that they need.

- **We do not think the Government is doing everything it can to support the physical and mental health of residents of affected buildings. The Government should work with local authorities to ensure that affected residents have access to the physical and mental health support they need.**

1 Introduction

1. On 14 June 2017, 72 residents tragically lost their lives in the Grenfell Tower fire. The tower block was wrapped in highly flammable aluminium composite material (ACM) cladding, as were more than 450 high-rise residential or publicly owned buildings in England.¹ Nearly four years after that awful tragedy, residents of some high-rise buildings have yet to see work begin to remove extremely dangerous ACM cladding.² Not only that, over the past four years a host of other building safety issues have been uncovered that leave thousands of residents up and down the country living in unsafe, unsellable homes. These include cladding made of non-ACM, yet still highly combustible, materials, and issues with fire breaks, fire doors, insulation, balconies, and compartmentation.

2. Since the fateful night of the Grenfell fire, this Committee has been at the forefront of calls to ensure that both new and existing homes are safe for residents, most recently through our pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Building Safety Bill, and through several inquiries on building safety, the latest of which, published in June 2020, focussed on the progress of cladding remediation.³ On 10 February 2021, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government announced the Government's latest interventions to support the removal of unsafe cladding. They include:

- an additional £3.5 billion towards cladding remediation for high-rise residential buildings above 18m (six storeys), on top of £1.6 billion already committed;
- a long-term loan scheme towards the costs of cladding remediation for buildings between 11m (four storeys) and 18m, with a maximum monthly payment of £50 per leaseholder;
- a developer levy that will apply when seeking to develop certain high-rise buildings in England; and
- a new tax for the UK residential property development sector, predicted to raise £2 billion over ten years from 2022 onwards, towards cladding remediation costs.⁴

3. It has been our unwavering position that leaseholders should bear no cost whatsoever for the remediation of building safety defects that were not of their making. That is why, while there was much to be welcomed in the Secretary of State's announcement, there was also much cause for concern. We decided to take evidence from affected leaseholders and stakeholders in the private and social housing sectors, to hear how they received the announcement. We are grateful to Dr Dean Buckner, Trustee, Leaseholder Knowledge Partnership; Dr Nigel Glen, CEO, Association of Residential Managing Agents (ARMA); Dr Will Martin, co-founder, UK Cladding Action Group; the Lord Porter of Spalding CBE, Fire and Building Safety Spokesman, Local Government Association; and Kate Henderson, Chief Executive, National Housing Association. We put our witnesses' concerns to the Minister of State for Building Safety, Fire and Communities, Lord Greenhalgh, and his official from the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local

1 MHCLG, [Building Safety Programme Monthly Data Release England: 31 March 2021](#), p 8

2 MHCLG, [Building Safety Programme Monthly Data Release England: 31 March 2021](#), p 14

3 HCLG Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2019–2021, [Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Building Safety Bill](#), HC 466; HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172

4 HC Deb, 10 February 2021, [cols 329–331](#) [Commons Chamber]

Government (MHCLG), Richard Goodman, Director-General, Building Safety, Grenfell & Net Zero. We are grateful to our witnesses for their time, as well as to our specialist advisers, Christine Whitehead, Emeritus Professor of Housing Economics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Kelvin MacDonald, Senior Fellow at the Department of Land Economy, University of Cambridge.

4. This report considers the scale of the problem of fire safety defects (Chapter 2), the question of how remediation of these defects should be paid for (Chapter 3), and the wider consequences for the housing market and the mental health of residents (Chapter 4). We reiterate a number of our conclusions and recommendations from our June 2020 report, and also make several others. We ask the Government to respond to this report before it introduces the Building Safety Bill to Parliament. We also note that the Government's response to our pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Building Safety Bill is overdue and we ask that the Government respond to that report as soon as possible.

2 The scale of the problem

5. To make homes safe, and to know how long that will take, we need to know how many residential buildings have fire safety defects and what those defects are. The Government publishes a monthly update on the progress of remediating ACM cladding on buildings 18m and above.⁵ We heard that those data were “just the tip of the iceberg”.⁶ As Kate Henderson explained:

There is not any clear and publicly available data, as far as we are aware, on the scale of non-ACM combustible materials on high-rise buildings, or combustible materials, including ACM, on buildings below 18 metres.⁷

6. In addition to the lack of data on the full extent of dangerous cladding, we have warned the Government before about the prevalence of fire safety defects not directly related to cladding.⁸ Once again, we heard from witnesses that cladding is not the only feature making people unsafe in their homes. Other fire safety defects that require remediation extend to fire breaks, fire doors, compartmentation, balconies, and insulation, among others.⁹ In our June 2020 report we recommended that:

In the same way as it has done for buildings with ACM cladding, the Government should publish a monthly data release on the number of buildings with non-ACM cladding and other serious fire safety defects awaiting remediation.¹⁰

The Government responded: “We are committed to publishing all appropriate information in the Building Safety Programme’s data release when ready”, but it has not started publishing data on buildings with non-ACM cladding or other fire safety defects, nor on the prevalence of ACM cladding on buildings under 18m.¹¹

7. We are concerned that the Government is bringing forward policy proposals, such as the loan scheme, without a good base of evidence. Richard Goodman told us that the Government assumes a similar prevalence of cladding on buildings 11–18m high as on buildings 18m or above in height, and that the likelihood for remediation will be lower for medium rise buildings due to “the ability to exit a building in time”—but neither he nor the Minister were able to provide any data.¹²

8. We also heard that a lack of capacity in the industry is hampering the pace of remediation. There are only so many professionals qualified to carry out both the inspections and the remedial work itself.¹³ Our witnesses estimated that it could take

5 MHCLG, [Building Safety Programme: monthly data release - March 2021](#), accessed 16 April 2021

6 [Q10](#)

7 [Q42](#)

8 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, paras 27–36

9 [Qq2–3, 41](#)

10 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 56

11 MHCLG, [Government Response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on Cladding: progress of remediation](#), September 2020, p 9

12 [Q77](#)

13 [Qq 16, 56](#)

anything from 5 to 15 years to complete a programme of cladding remediation works.¹⁴ The Minister, conversely, claimed that the Government has not encountered significant capacity constraints within the industry.¹⁵

9. **We are concerned that, despite our previous recommendation on this issue, the Government still lacks data on the full scale and extent of remediation needed for buildings both below and above 18m. In order to know how much it will cost to remove unsafe cladding from multi-storey buildings once and for all, how long it will take, and whether the industry has the capacity to carry out these works, the Government needs to be collecting and publishing these data as a matter of urgency.**

10. *We reiterate our recommendation from our June 2020 report that in the same way as it has done for buildings with ACM cladding, the Government should publish a monthly data release on the number of buildings with non-ACM cladding and other serious fire safety defects awaiting remediation. This data release should also explicitly include buildings between 11m and 18m as well as buildings 18m and above.*

14 [Qq 8–9](#)

15 [Q83](#)

3 Who pays for remediation?

Limitations of funding for remediation

11. We welcome any new funding that helps to ensure that costs for remediation are not passed onto leaseholders. The additional £3.5 billion announced by the Secretary of State towards non-ACM cladding remediation for high-rise residential buildings above 18m, on top of £1.6 billion already committed (£1 billion for non-ACM cladding and £600 million for ACM cladding), is significant.¹⁶ However, the funding does not go far enough. In our June 2020 report, we estimated that the full cost of all fire safety remediation works could be up to £15 billion.¹⁷ While our witnesses also welcomed the extra funding, they again told us current funding is insufficient.¹⁸ We are concerned, additionally, about perceived and real restrictions to this fund, arising from interpretations of the contract, as well as fundamental issues concerning who can access the fund and what it can be used for.

Consideration of risk

12. Costs that are eligible for the £5.1 billion Building Safety Fund only cover remediation works that are (i) related to cladding and (ii) in buildings 18m and above, on the basis that these pose the greatest threat to safety.¹⁹ Once again, we heard calls to take a more holistic approach to risk, taking account not just of the height of the building and the type of cladding, but also the amount of cladding, who lives in the building and their ability to evacuate quickly, whether there are fire sprinklers, and new developments in understanding unsafe materials.²⁰ As Kate Henderson put it:

... you could consider a building that is 17 metres high but has a lot of ACM on it as higher risk than a building that is 20 metres high but has a small amount of another material. The way the current system is working ... means that we are only able to supply remediation to buildings where you can access that support, rather than buildings that are really the highest risk.²¹

13. We are grateful to the Minister for writing to us to clarify the eligible costs under the Building Safety Fund, which include all works directly related to the removal and replacement of unsafe non-ACM cladding systems in buildings 18m and above, including the replacement of insulation that is part of the cladding system.²² In his oral evidence, the Minister gave other examples of works that are covered by the fund, as outlined in the funding prospectus, such as remediation of fire cavity barriers and balconies that are integral to the cladding system.²³

16 For further detail on funding for cladding remediation, see: [Leasehold high-rise blocks: who pays for fire safety work?](#), Commons Briefing Paper CBP8244, House of Commons Library, February 2021

17 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 35

18 [Qq2, 3, 40](#)

19 MHCLG, [Government Response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on Cladding: progress of remediation](#), September 2020, p 5

20 [Q43](#)

21 [Q43](#)

22 [Letter from the Minister of State for Building Safety, Fire and Communities to the Chair dated 24 March 2021 following up his appearance before the Committee on 8 March](#)

23 [Q86](#)

Non-cladding fire safety defects

14. We are concerned about the lack of financial support for the remediation of fire safety defects not directly related to cladding, which we heard could be as costly as cladding remediation. The situation of Dr Will Martin, co-founder of UK Cladding Action Group, is illustrative:

We have ACM, which has been funded, but the remaining estimated £6.2 million of work is not covered by the funds. In 12 months' time, when the scaffolding is down and the ACM has been removed, the building will remain unsafe and still be unsellable. It will remain like that without intervention, because the leaseholders do not have the money.²⁴

15. In our June 2020 report, we argued that “funding will need to be increased to address all safety defects in every high-rise or high-risk building”.²⁵ Since then, we received estimates from ARMA that indicate that the costs of non-cladding remediation are broadly equal to the costs of cladding remediation, at £25,671 for each flat in blocks 18m and above, and £38,184 for each flat in blocks below 18m (compared with £25,511 and £40,240 for cladding costs respectively).²⁶

16. Our witnesses were also concerned about leaseholders finding themselves in a situation where expensive non-cladding remediation work needs to be in place before funding for cladding remediation can be accessed, effectively making them hostage to the situation.²⁷ We are grateful to the Minister for writing to clarify the clause in the Building Safety Fund contract that caused confusion:

The requirement is simply that we must ensure that remediation of the unsafe cladding systems is not delayed by funding shortfalls for any additional works the applicant may elect to take forward at the same time as the cladding remediation works, and which are not eligible for funding. There is no blanket requirement for an agreement to fund all other works, and certainly no requirement for applicants to undertake other works at the same time as the cladding works. To be clear, if the applicant wished to take forward such works at a different time (and as separate projects), this would not affect the payment of funding for cladding remediation.²⁸

Access to funds by social housing providers

17. Once again, we heard concerns from our witnesses about excluding providers of social housing from the recently increased Building Safety Fund except in specific circumstances. In our report in June 2020, we recommended that “[t]he Government must ensure that social housing providers have full and equal access to the Building Safety Fund”.²⁹ In response, the Government outlined the conditions whereby social landlords can apply to the fund—where costs would otherwise be passed onto leaseholders and

24 [Q2](#)

25 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 35

26 [Association of Residential Managing Agents briefing notes on building insurance costs and cladding statistics](#)

27 [Qq2, 15](#)

28 [Letter from the Minister of State for Building Safety, Fire and Communities to the Chair dated 24 March 2021 following up his appearance before the Committee on 8 March](#)

29 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 25

where costs threaten the financial viability of the provider—and stated Government’s “confidence in local authorities’ and housing associations’ ability to carry out and finance remediation work”.³⁰ It strikes us that these conditions are a reversal of the Government’s original policy. When the Government introduced its first £400 million towards the remediation of ACM cladding in May 2018, the fund was exclusively for councils and housing associations.³¹ Now it is the case that “housing associations and councils cannot access funding for remedial works in properties where tenants live”.³² While we were told that social renters would not face rent or service charge increases to meet these costs, since rents and services charges for social renters are regulated, we are troubled by the principle that on the one hand, the monies social tenants pay in rent could be used towards remediation costs, but that on the other, the Building Safety Fund provides a safety net for leaseholders of social homes.³³ It is unfair for one neighbour, who is a leaseholder, to have their cladding remediation costs met by the Building Safety Fund, while another, who is a tenant, contributes through their rent payments.

18. We welcome the additional £3.5 billion funding towards cladding remediation for buildings 18m and above in height, which is a significant increase on the £1.6 billion already committed. However, we are concerned about perceived and real restrictions to the Building Safety Fund which affect residents’ safety, and the approach to allocating funds. In addition, significantly more money is needed; as we concluded in our June 2020 report, the costs of all fire safety remediations could be up to £15 billion.

19. The Government should establish a Comprehensive Building Safety Fund for full remediation works of affected buildings. In allocating funds from the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, the Government should move away from the current height- and product-based approach and should instead take a holistic, risk- and evidence-based approach that prioritises occupants who are most at risk. To support that approach, the Government should consider establishing a more formal process for identifying and prioritising risk holistically and report back to the Committee on the best way to achieve this, along with the evidence.

20. A building that is half-safe is a building that is unsafe. Leaseholders are no more responsible for non-cladding fire safety defects than they are for the presence of combustible cladding on their homes. The costs of non-cladding related remediation could be just as high as the costs of cladding remediation. Leaseholders should not be expected to pay for these any more than they should be expected to pay for cladding remediation. We call for a Comprehensive Building Safety Fund that:

- *applies to all high-risk buildings of any height, irrespective of tenure;*
- *covers all fire safety defects, including combustible insulation; and*
- *covers all associated costs.*

21. The Comprehensive Building Safety Fund should be fully funded by Government and industry, and the Government should establish clear principles regarding how the

30 MHCLG, [Government Response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on Cladding: progress of remediation](#), September 2020, p 6

31 MHCLG, ‘[Government announces it will fully fund unsafe cladding removal in social housing](#)’, 16 May 2018

32 [Q41](#)

33 [Q54](#)

costs should be split between the two. Total contributions should not be capped, given that, as we have already highlighted, the full scale of remediation needed is not yet fully known. We consider industry contributions further later in this chapter.

22. Social housing providers should have full and equal access to government funds for remediation, whether through the existing Building Safety Fund or our proposed Comprehensive Building Safety Fund. Our proposed Comprehensive Building Safety Fund would cover all necessary remediation, including relating to non-cladding fire safety defects, but if the Government does not accept this recommendation and continues to fund only cladding-related works, it should:

- *update the Building Safety Fund contract to make clear that funding does not need to be in place for non-cladding remediation works in order for any recipient to access funding for cladding remediation works; and*
- *engage with relevant stakeholders to ensure that any confusion regarding this issue is resolved.*

Loan scheme for leaseholders in buildings 11–18m high

23. It has consistently been this Committee’s position that leaseholders should not have to contribute towards any of the costs for a problem they played no part in creating. Indeed, it is a position the Government has articulated on numerous occasions.³⁴ In our pre-legislative scrutiny of the Building Safety Bill we expressed our deep concerns about the Government’s apparent shift in rhetoric, away from protecting leaseholders from the costs of remediation, towards protecting them only from **unaffordable** costs. We recommended that the Government “recommit to the principle that leaseholders should not pay anything towards the cost of remediating historical building safety defects”.³⁵

24. In the Secretary of State’s announcement on 10 February 2021, we learnt that the Government had not accepted our recommendation and intends to make certain leaseholders pay. We also learnt what the Government considers to be an affordable cost. Specifically, the Government intends to make leaseholders of buildings between 11m and 18m high contribute towards the costs of cladding remediation through a loan scheme, paying up to £50 a month. The length of the loan has not been specified as anything other than “long-term”. It is concerning, and surprising, that the Government considers that paying £600 a year over a long-term and undefined period for a problem you did nothing to cause is an affordable cost. As Dr Will Martin told us: “Living in a low-rise building does not mean you are richer”.³⁶

25. We were disappointed, and concerned, to have received very little information about the operation of the loan scheme in our evidence from the Government. The Minister informed us that the policy is a work in progress and that Government officials are still working out the detail.³⁷ Richard Goodman pointed out that the loan scheme was received

34 HCLG Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2019–2021, [Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Building Safety Bill](#), HC 466, paras 24–25

35 HCLG Committee, Fifth Report of Session 2019–2021, [Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Building Safety Bill](#), HC 466, paras 26–32

36 [Q6](#)

37 [Qq101–102, Letter from the Minister of State for Building Safety, Fire and Communities to the Chair dated 24 March 2021 following up his appearance before the Committee on 8 March](#)

positively by some lenders for bringing some certainty back into the market.³⁸ We struggle to see how a policy that has had none of the detail worked out provides certainty. There remain questions about how long the loan scheme will be for, on what basis a £50 monthly cap was determined to be ‘affordable’, how the actual amount the leaseholder pays will be calculated, what happens if someone defaults, or cannot or will not pay, what the total cost of the taxpayer subsidy will be, and, as we have already seen, what the total extent and cost of cladding remediation for buildings between 11m and 18m actually is.³⁹ We received no answer to the question of whether an impact assessment had been carried out on the loan scheme.⁴⁰ We heard of potential negative impacts on house prices and the borrowing capacity of housing associations.⁴¹

26. Of particular concern is also the question of to whom the loan is made: the building, the freeholder, or the leaseholder? We heard that it is very difficult to make a loan to a legal entity corresponding to a building, but that lending to freeholders is also problematic, since freeholders cannot take out a separate loan if they have a charge on their interest in the building.⁴² The Minister made clear in oral evidence that the loan would be at the building level and that work was ongoing to “ensure that the loan attaches on a per-building basis and to a leasehold, rather than to a leaseholder, for instance, through the service charge regime as a potential mechanism”.⁴³

27. We heard in oral evidence that the loan scheme is not the Government’s only option. The Leasehold Knowledge Partnership told us that they have proposed a special purpose vehicle as an alternative to raise funds for fire safety remediation.⁴⁴

28. It is disappointing that the Government’s proposed loan scheme, whereby leaseholders contribute up to £50 a month to pay for cladding remediation works on buildings between 11m and 18m high, does not satisfy the previously agreed principle that leaseholders should not pay. Leaseholders of buildings below 18m are no more responsible for fire safety defects, and no more able to pay, than leaseholders of buildings above 18m. The Government appears to be prioritising certainty for lenders above fairness for leaseholders. We are particularly worried by how little detail about the loan scheme has been established.

29. The Government should abolish the loan scheme. We reiterate our call on the Government to re-establish the principle that leaseholders should not pay anything towards the cost of remediating historical building safety defects. Instead, as we have stated, costs should be fully met by the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, to be funded by Government and industry.

Proposed developers levy and tax

30. The Secretary of State announced on 10 February 2021 a new gateway 2 developer levy and a new tax for the UK residential property development sector.⁴⁵ The former applies

38 [Q97](#)

39 [Qq6](#), [79](#), [95](#)

40 [Q99](#)

41 [Qq4](#), [27](#), [44](#)

42 [Qq4–5](#)

43 [Q105](#)

44 [Q7](#)

45 HC Deb, 10 February 2021, [col 330](#) [Commons Chamber]

to developers seeking permission to build certain new high-rises and has no numbers attached to it; the latter is projected to raise £2 billion over ten years but no details on the tax itself have been provided. In oral evidence, the Minister confirmed that the developer tax will be on profits (as opposed to a levy in order to build) and that the Treasury and MHCLG are still working on the detail.⁴⁶ The Minister additionally confirmed that monies raised from the developer levy will be supplementary to the £2 billion raised from the developer tax. Concerningly, he initially appeared to confirm that this £2 billion could be offset against the £5.1 billion provided by the taxpayer, saying: “[o]f course, [the tax and levy] will go towards the taxpayer commitment that is now in excess of £5 billion”; upon later questioning the Minister said the details are yet to be finalised.⁴⁷

31. We have previously estimated that the full cost of remediating fire safety defects in every high-rise or high-risk residential building could be up to £15 billion.⁴⁸ As it currently stands, the Government has committed £5.1 billion, composed of £2 billion raised through a new developer tax and the remaining £3.1 billion picked up by the taxpayer. Our concern is what proportion of the remaining £10 billion leaseholders may end up paying: it should be none, and to ensure this is the case the Government needs a clear plan to ensure that those who are responsible for fire safety defects make a substantial contribution. The Government has not indicated the amount that it expects to raise from the new developer levy. Our witnesses were concerned that developers could pass on the costs of the levy to housing associations and house buyers, the former of which could squeeze out affordable housing contributions and the latter of which is another version of making leaseholders pay.⁴⁹ Some developers have, laudably, committed millions to remediation—for example £125 million by Taylor Wimpey and £75 million by Persimmon—but we heard that compared to their pre-tax profits, it is reasonable to ask developers to contribute more.⁵⁰ While we heard some sympathy for the argument that the goal posts had changed and for the fact that not all developers are responsible for the fire safety defects at issue, we also heard of shoddy workmanship, corruption, falsified data, and gaming product-testing by some in the industry.⁵¹ The Minister hinted at an opportunity to raise further funds via contributions from product manufacturers, which we would welcome.⁵²

32. The Committee welcomes the introduction of a new developer levy and tax to ensure that developers contribute towards the costs of remediation. We recognise and welcome the fact that some developers have already committed millions towards remediation funds. We also recognise the need to encourage the building of new homes, and that not all members of the construction industry are responsible for fire safety defects. Notwithstanding, we consider that developers can and should be expected to make a greater contribution to the costs of remediation. *The developer levy and tax should be extended and should serve as an additional contribution to the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, in line with principles to be set out by the Government, as we have recommended, about how the full funds for remediation should*

46 [Q122](#)

47 [Qq 74, 135](#)

48 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 35

49 [Qq38, 60–61](#)

50 [Q37](#)

51 [Qq37–38, 57, 120](#)

52 [Qq120, 124](#)

be split between industry and Government. The Government should also consult with all relevant stakeholders to design the gateway 2 developer levy in such a way so that costs are not passed onto house buyers, including housing associations.

33. *We also ask the Government to consider how others, including product manufacturers and suppliers, can contribute to the costs of fire safety remediation, in line with principles set out by the Government about the proportion of costs to be met by industry.*

Support for leaseholders with high interim costs

Waking Watches

34. Tens of thousands of leaseholders have been forced to pay for interim safety measures while they wait for their buildings to be made safe. The most common of these are 24-hour waking watch patrols. We recommended that the Government should include the costs for interim fire safety measures in the Building Safety Fund for the remediation of affected buildings.⁵³ We were pleased to see the Government announce a £30 million waking watch relief fund in December 2020, towards the costs of installing alarm systems in buildings above 17.7m high that have unsafe cladding and where the costs of waking watches are being passed onto leaseholders.⁵⁴ Social sector buildings are eligible for the fund only where the Registered Provider can evidence that waking watch costs have been passed onto leaseholders and that the costs of installing an alarm would also fall on leaseholders.

35. Our witnesses welcomed the waking watch relief fund, which they saw as the first indication that the Government recognised the interim costs being faced by leaseholders.⁵⁵ However, they argued that it did not go far enough, pointing out that the VAT alone from waking watches has brought in over £30 million since the Grenfell fire.⁵⁶ The Minister himself recognised that £30 million does not cover the costs of installing alarms in all affected buildings.⁵⁷ The fund will support between 300 and 460 buildings,⁵⁸ but in London alone there are 590 buildings with a waking watch.⁵⁹ Our witnesses pointed out that buildings under 17.7m with waking watches are excluded.⁶⁰ Data from ARMA suggest that the cost of waking watches is £213,000 per year, per block.⁶¹ Dr Nigel Glen described waking watch as “a leech that has been sucking the blood out of leaseholders for a long time”. He pointed to its long-term effects in the private sector, insofar as reserve funds have been diverted away from building maintenance to pay for waking watches; this was echoed by Kate Henderson regarding the social housing sector.⁶² Dr Will Martin

53 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 74

54 MHCLG, [‘Waking Watch Relief Fund’](#), accessed 15 April 2021

55 [Q19](#)

56 [Q19](#)

57 [Qq19, 48, 116](#)

58 MHCLG, [‘Building Safety Programme: Waking Watch costs’](#), accessed 15 April 2021

59 London Assembly, [‘Waking Watches’ costing Londoners £16,000 an hour’](#), 12 February 2021

60 [Q19](#)

61 [Q21](#)

62 [Qq21, 48](#)

pointed out that even where alarms have replaced waking watches, National Fire Chiefs Council’s guidance still requires evacuation marshals on site, representing a further cost to leaseholders.⁶³

36. We welcome the introduction of the waking watch relief fund, which shows the Government recognises that intervention is needed to support leaseholders with interim fire safety costs. However, the scheme does not go far enough. It does not cover the costs of installing alarms in all affected buildings, and there can still be ongoing costs for leaseholders who do have alarms installed. Funding should be extended—either through the relief fund or through the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund—to cover all interim fire safety costs in all high-risk buildings (as defined by our recommended risk-based approach), including those below 17.7m.

Buildings insurance

37. Last year we warned the Government about soaring building insurance costs for residents, recommending that the Government should make sure that residents have access to reasonably priced buildings insurance in the period until their buildings are remediated.⁶⁴ We also recommended that the Government should act as the insurer of last resort for buildings unable to obtain insurance, and underwrite a percentage of the insurance on any affected higher-rise and high-risk buildings where premiums have increased by more than 50% in the last two years.⁶⁵ In response, the Government indicated that it is engaging with the insurance industry and would address insurance issues related to building safety through the draft Building Safety Bill.⁶⁶

38. Our witnesses asserted that the issue of affordable building insurance had not been addressed through the draft Building Safety Bill.⁶⁷ Statistics provided to the Committee by ARMA indicate that on average, insurance premiums quadrupled in the past year.⁶⁸ The Leasehold Knowledge Partnership have assessed that insurance premiums have risen six-fold.⁶⁹ One in ten of ARMA’s cases were rises of over 1,000%—with one case of 1,840%.⁷⁰ Lord Porter of Spalding CBE, Fire and Building Safety Spokesman for the Local Government Association, gave us his personal view that “[t]he Government have no choice; they must levy a windfall tax on the insurance industry. The insurance industry is profiteering the same as the money lenders are from the whole thing”.⁷¹

39. The Minister recognised that the building insurance issue was of “considerable concern”, stating that “the number of claims made for fires in high-rise buildings has been reducing quite a bit, so it is surprising to see sometimes what is up to a 1,000% increase against a background where the volumes are going down”.⁷² He acknowledged, too, that in some cases buildings are “completely without insurance”.⁷³ To address the issue, the

63 [Q19](#)

64 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 79

65 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 80

66 MHCLG, [Government Response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on Cladding: progress of remediation](#), September 2020, p 14

67 [Qq22, 48](#)

68 [Association of Residential Managing Agents briefing notes on building insurance costs and cladding statistics](#)

69 [Q23](#)

70 [Association of Residential Managing Agents briefing notes on building insurance costs and cladding statistics](#)

71 [Q50](#)

72 [Q117](#)

73 [Q119](#)

Minister informed us, the British Insurance Brokers' Association is exploring a market-based intervention. In addition, the Minister is holding roundtables with insurance and cladding groups and “making the moral arguments” to incentivise the market to reduce premiums. Finally, the Minister indicated that the Government is prepared, failing the first two interventions, to step in as a last resort.⁷⁴

40. We are concerned by the lack of progress on keeping residents' building insurance costs reasonable during the period when their buildings are being remediated. The Government has been engaging with the insurance industry for months, and all the while leaseholders are seeing their premiums skyrocket—yet another cost they are facing for a problem not of their making—or worse, living in uninsured buildings. *The time has come for the Government to consider setting a deadline for the insurance industry to act. If that deadline is not met, the Government should intervene to require industry to resolve the problem of eye-watering building insurance premiums.*

4 The wider impacts of the cladding crisis

Housing market

41. We heard from our witnesses that uncertainty around building safety is having a significant impact on the wider housing market. One witness called it a “perfect storm”.⁷⁵ Some of that impact concerns lenders’ decisions around the need to complete an EWS1 form on selling or re-mortgaging. The EWS1 form was introduced in 2019 for valuation purposes, in order to provide assurance on the safety of external wall systems. The form is not a statutory requirement, however many lenders demanded them, and there was a shortage of qualified professionals to complete the process.⁷⁶ On 8 March 2021, the same day that we questioned the Minister, the Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) published new guidance designed to “unlock” the flat market for buyers and sellers by clarifying which properties require EWS1 forms.⁷⁷ The Minister told us the Government estimates that 500,000 leaseholders have been taken out of the scope of the EWS1 process, and that the lenders welcomed the new guidance.⁷⁸ It remains to be seen how the lenders will interpret the new guidance and what impact that will have on the buying and selling of multi-storey flats.

42. The impact on the wider housing market goes beyond the issues around EWS1 forms. In addition to the negative impact that the Government’s proposed loan scheme—which we do not support—may have on house prices, we were told that the problem was not the EWS1 form itself, but the “underlying uncertainty” around building safety, which affects not just multi-storey flats but the entire property chain,⁷⁹ as summarised by Dr Nigel Glen:

We should be very concerned. We have a perfect storm here. It is ghastly what is happening to the market. We have the cladding. Then we believe the non-cladding is going to perhaps dwarf that. You have the stopping of the sales. Rentals could start stopping because, as management agents, we are being approached by the lettings agent saying, “You need to certify before I can rent that this building is safe”. We are going, “We cannot because we do not know”. Sorry to sound like a bit of a doom-monger here, but it could be very significant across the whole property market.⁸⁰

Dr Dean Buckner warned of the impact on banking capital ratios:

Banks have a sliver of capital available to absorb losses. Some of those losses could be caused by borrowers defaulting on their mortgages. If those ratios begin to slip and banks become clearly in trouble, that affects all of us, because we all have money with banks.⁸¹

75 [Q30](#)

76 [The Cladding External Wall System \(EWS\)](#), Constituency Casework, House of Commons Library, 15 April 2021

77 [“RICS makes move to unlock market for flat-owners”](#), Royal Institute of Chartered Surveyors, 8 March 2021

78 [Q125](#)

79 [Qq27–29](#)

80 [Q30](#)

81 [Q31](#)

The eventual outcome in the private sector, we were warned, was forfeitures and repossessions.⁸²

43. When we asked the Minister what assessment had been done on the impact on the wider housing market, he said:

We have made an assessment, in the sense that we have a plan. There are three elements to the plan. One is working with insurers and encouraging lenders to be proportionate to risk and to reduce the demand. We are working with RICS, which carried out this consultation. The Secretary of State and I have had many meetings with the RICS leadership about this, but it is their consultation and their findings. It is absolutely right that it is professionally led.

The second thing is that we step up and fund a scheme to increase supply [of assessors qualified to conduct EWS1 assessments]. The third element is that there have been some issues around professional indemnity insurance being available to some of the people who carry out the EWS1 survey, and stepping in and ensuring that they have access to professional indemnity insurance.

Essentially, the assessment is that, yes, there is a problem, and the approach has been to restrict demand, increase supply and ensure insurance cover, so that these important reports, where needed, can be carried out.⁸³

44. The new guidance on EWS1 forms alone is not sufficient to mitigate the short-term and long-term impacts that the underlying uncertainty around building safety is having and will have on the wider housing market. We ask the Government to report back to this Committee with its assessment of the impact of fire safety remediation on the wider housing market. The Government should ask the Prudential Regulation Authority to assess the impact of fire safety remediation on banking capital ratios.

Quality and quantity of social housing

45. Our witnesses told us that because social housing providers cannot access the Building Safety Fund for properties where tenants live, local government funds are being diverted to remediation work that would otherwise be invested in repairing and maintaining existing homes and building more social housing.⁸⁴ We were told of one example in south London, where a new development of temporary accommodation to tackle homelessness had to be paused in order to pay for the remediation of an existing building.⁸⁵ We heard that the same restrictions to the waking watch relief fund were having the same effect.⁸⁶ Lord Porter informed us of 389 social housing blocks with waking watches in Birmingham,

82 [Qq33–34](#)

83 [Q128](#)

84 [Qq41, 52](#)

85 [Q52](#)

86 [Q48](#)

London, Manchester and Slough, saying: “As far as we know, no councils have applied to the waking watch relief fund and only two housing associations have. The waking watch relief fund only covers the costs of waking watches passed on to leaseholders.”⁸⁷

46. When we put these concerns to the Minister, he acknowledged the challenges facing providers of social housing. He pointed to £12 billion of government funding made available for building more affordable housing.⁸⁸ The Minister explained that the restrictions on the Building Safety Fund are to ensure fairness between tenants and leaseholders, so that remediation costs that are not passed onto tenants are not passed onto leaseholders.⁸⁹ However, when pressed on the diversion of funds from repairs and maintenance, he described the situation as “hypothetical”.⁹⁰ We were told that the Government had not conducted an impact assessment on the impact of paying for cladding remediation on building new social homes or maintaining existing social homes, “partially because individual social landlords will make their own choices about what they need to remediate”.⁹¹

47. We are concerned that the exclusion of social landlords from the Building Safety Fund and waking watch relief fund except in specific circumstances is having negative consequences for the wider social housing sector. While the £12 billion Affordable Homes Programme is welcome, any funds diverted from building new social homes to pay for cladding remediation will still result in fewer, much-needed, new social homes being built. *In addition to our recommendation that social housing providers should have full and equal access to the Building Safety Fund, preferably our proposed Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, the Government should:*

- *ensure that social housing providers have full and equal access to the waking watch relief fund; and*
- *carry out and publish an impact assessment on the knock-on effects of fire safety remediation on maintaining existing social homes and building new social homes.*

Mental health of residents

48. We have stressed before that this crisis is about more than statistics, costs, and materials. At its heart are people: people trapped in unsafe, unsellable homes. After a year in which we have spent more time in our homes than ever before, it is appropriate that we conclude by reflecting on the toll taken by residents. We believe the testimony from the UK Cladding Action Group merits lengthy quotation:

Nearly a quarter of people have told us that they feel suicidal or want to self-harm. Nine out of 10 people say that their mental health has deteriorated. Seven out of 10 people say that they cannot sleep at night. We regularly have people contacting us, telling us that they have had enough and cannot continue on. Covid has made things even harder as well. I

87 [Letter from Lord Porter of Spalding to the Chair dated 5 March 2021 following up his appearance before the Committee on 1 March](#)

88 [Q142](#)

89 [Qq145–146](#)

90 [Q147](#)

91 [Q148](#)

cannot communicate to anyone who is not a leaseholder in one of these buildings the fear and complete sense of limbo. You cannot see what your future is going to be like, because all you can see is bills and worry. The impact of living in one of these buildings is horrific.

We also should not forget that mental health affects our physical health. It affects our relationships and our work. It affects the people around us. People tell us that they cannot concentrate at work. One in four, in fact, actually said that they have had to take time off work because of their situations. Others tell us that they feel suicidal at least once every day. People have had to turn down jobs in other cities. People cannot start families. People have been diagnosed with new conditions.⁹²

49. In our previous report, we asked the Government to offer NHS support for the physical and mental health needs of residents in affected buildings and to provide signposting to services for residents worried about their safety or financial situation.⁹³ In response—published six months into the covid-19 pandemic—the Government said that concerned residents should contact their GPs and that it was the responsibility of the “accountable person”, as provided for in the draft Building Safety Bill, to engage with residents.⁹⁴ We are disappointed with this response, which puts the responsibility on others, and fails, in our view, to recognise the scale of the public health crisis that we described and which has since shown no signs of improving.

50. **We do not think the Government is doing everything it can to support the physical and mental health of residents of affected buildings. *The Government should work with local authorities to ensure that affected residents have access to the physical and mental health support they need. The Government should make it an explicit requirement that the information that the “accountable person” is required to share with residents includes signposting to support services for residents worried about their safety, financial situation, and physical and mental health. In the interim, the Government itself should supply this information to residents.***

92 [Q18](#)

93 HCLG Committee, Second Report of Session 2019–2021, [Cladding: progress of remediation](#), HC 172, para 95

94 MHCLG, [Government Response to the Housing, Communities and Local Government Select Committee report on Cladding: progress of remediation](#), September 2020, pp 16–17

Conclusions and recommendations

The scale of the problem

1. We are concerned that, despite our previous recommendation on this issue, the Government still lacks data on the full scale and extent of remediation needed for buildings both below and above 18m. In order to know how much it will cost to remove unsafe cladding from multi-storey buildings once and for all, how long it will take, and whether the industry has the capacity to carry out these works, the Government needs to be collecting and publishing these data as a matter of urgency. (Paragraph 9)
2. *We reiterate our recommendation from our June 2020 report that in the same way as it has done for buildings with ACM cladding, the Government should publish a monthly data release on the number of buildings with non-ACM cladding and other serious fire safety defects awaiting remediation. This data release should also explicitly include buildings between 11m and 18m as well as buildings 18m and above.* (Paragraph 10)

Who pays for remediation?

3. We welcome the additional £3.5 billion funding towards cladding remediation for buildings 18m and above in height, which is a significant increase on the £1.6 billion already committed. However, we are concerned about perceived and real restrictions to the Building Safety Fund which affect residents' safety, and the approach to allocating funds. In addition, significantly more money is needed; as we concluded in our June 2020 report, the costs of all fire safety remediations could be up to £15 billion. (Paragraph 18)
4. *The Government should establish a Comprehensive Building Safety Fund for full remediation works of affected buildings. In allocating funds from the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, the Government should move away from the current height- and product-based approach and should instead take a holistic, risk- and evidence-based approach that prioritises occupants who are most at risk. To support that approach, the Government should consider establishing a more formal process for identifying and prioritising risk holistically and report back to the Committee on the best way to achieve this, along with the evidence.* (Paragraph 19)
5. A building that is half-safe is a building that is unsafe. Leaseholders are no more responsible for non-cladding fire safety defects than they are for the presence of combustible cladding on their homes. The costs of non-cladding related remediation could be just as high as the costs of cladding remediation. Leaseholders should not be expected to pay for these any more than they should be expected to pay for cladding remediation. *We call for a Comprehensive Building Safety Fund that:*
 - *applies to all high-risk buildings of any height, irrespective of tenure;*
 - *covers all fire safety defects, including combustible insulation; and*
 - *covers all associated costs.* (Paragraph 20)

6. *The Comprehensive Building Safety Fund should be fully funded by Government and industry, and the Government should establish clear principles regarding how the costs should be split between the two. Total contributions should not be capped, given that, as we have already highlighted, the full scale of remediation needed is not yet fully known. (Paragraph 21)*
7. *Social housing providers should have full and equal access to government funds for remediation, whether through the existing Building Safety Fund or our proposed Comprehensive Building Safety Fund. Our proposed Comprehensive Building Safety Fund would cover all necessary remediation, including relating to non-cladding fire safety defects, but if the Government does not accept this recommendation and continues to fund only cladding-related works, it should:*
 - *update the Building Safety Fund contract to make clear that funding does not need to be in place for non-cladding remediation works in order for any recipient to access funding for cladding remediation works; and*
 - *engage with relevant stakeholders to ensure that any confusion regarding this issue is resolved. (Paragraph 22)*
8. *It is disappointing that the Government's proposed loan scheme, whereby leaseholders contribute up to £50 a month to pay for cladding remediation works on buildings between 11m and 18m high, does not satisfy the previously agreed principle that leaseholders should not pay. Leaseholders of buildings below 18m are no more responsible for fire safety defects, and no more able to pay, than leaseholders of buildings above 18m. The Government appears to be prioritising certainty for lenders above fairness for leaseholders. We are particularly worried by how little detail about the loan scheme has been established. (Paragraph 28)*
9. *The Government should abolish the loan scheme. We reiterate our call on the Government to re-establish the principle that leaseholders should not pay anything towards the cost of remediating historical building safety defects. Instead, as we have stated, costs should be fully met by the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, to be funded by Government and industry. (Paragraph 29)*
10. *The Committee welcomes the introduction of a new developer levy and tax to ensure that developers contribute towards the costs of remediation. We recognise and welcome the fact that some developers have already committed millions towards remediation funds. We also recognise the need to encourage the building of new homes, and that not all members of the construction industry are responsible for fire safety defects. Notwithstanding, we consider that developers can and should be expected to make a greater contribution to the costs of remediation. *The developer levy and tax should be extended and should serve as an additional contribution to the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, in line with principles to be set out by the Government, as we have recommended, about how the full funds for remediation should be split between industry and Government. The Government should also consult with all relevant stakeholders to design the gateway 2 developer levy in such a way so that costs are not passed onto house buyers, including housing associations. (Paragraph 32)**

11. *We also ask the Government to consider how others, including product manufacturers and suppliers, can contribute to the costs of fire safety remediation, in line with principles set out by the Government about the proportion of costs to be met by industry. (Paragraph 33)*
12. *We welcome the introduction of the waking watch relief fund, which shows the Government recognises that intervention is needed to support leaseholders with interim fire safety costs. However, the scheme does not go far enough. It does not cover the costs of installing alarms in all affected buildings, and there can still be ongoing costs for leaseholders who do have alarms installed. Funding should be extended—either through the relief fund or through the Comprehensive Building Safety Fund—to cover all interim fire safety costs in all high-risk buildings (as defined by our recommended risk-based approach), including those below 17.7m. (Paragraph 36)*
13. *We are concerned by the lack of progress on keeping residents’ building insurance costs reasonable during the period when their buildings are being remediated. The Government has been engaging with the insurance industry for months, and all the while leaseholders are seeing their premiums skyrocket—yet another cost they are facing for a problem not of their making—or worse, living in uninsured buildings. The time has come for the Government to consider setting a deadline for the insurance industry to act. If that deadline is not met, the Government should intervene to require industry to resolve the problem of eye-watering building insurance premiums. (Paragraph 40)*

The wider impacts of the cladding crisis

14. *The new guidance on EWS1 forms alone is not sufficient to mitigate the short-term and long-term impacts that the underlying uncertainty around building safety is having and will have on the wider housing market. We ask the Government to report back to this Committee with its assessment of the impact of fire safety remediation on the wider housing market. The Government should ask the Prudential Regulation Authority to assess the impact of fire safety remediation on banking capital ratios. (Paragraph 44)*
15. *We are concerned that the exclusion of social landlords from the Building Safety Fund and waking watch relief fund except in specific circumstances is having negative consequences for the wider social housing sector. While the £12 billion Affordable Homes Programme is welcome, any funds diverted from building new social homes to pay for cladding remediation will still result in fewer, much-needed, new social homes being built. In addition to our recommendation that social housing providers should have full and equal access to the Building Safety Fund, preferably our proposed Comprehensive Building Safety Fund, the Government should:*
 - *ensure that social housing providers have full and equal access to the waking watch relief fund; and*
 - *carry out and publish an impact assessment on the knock-on effects of fire safety remediation on maintaining existing social homes and building new social homes. (Paragraph 47)*

16. We do not think the Government is doing everything it can to support the physical and mental health of residents of affected buildings. *The Government should work with local authorities to ensure that affected residents have access to the physical and mental health support they need. The Government should make it an explicit requirement that the information that the “accountable person” is required to share with residents includes signposting to support services for residents worried about their safety, financial situation, and physical and mental health. In the interim, the Government itself should supply this information to residents.* (Paragraph 50)

Formal minutes

Monday 26 April 2021

Members present:

Mr Clive Betts, in the Chair

Ian Byrne	Brendan Clarke-Smith
Florence Eshalomi	Ben Everitt
Ian Levy	Andrew Lewer
Mary Robinson	Mohammad Yasin

Draft report (*Cladding Remediation—Follow-up*) proposed by the Chair, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 50 read and agreed to.

Summary agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Seventh Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

[Adjourned until Thursday 13 May at 3pm

Witnesses

The following witnesses gave evidence. Transcripts can be viewed on the [inquiry publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Monday 1 March 2021

Dr Dean Buckner, Trustee, Leasehold Knowledge Partnership; **Dr Nigel Glen**, CEO, Association of Residential Managing Agents; **Dr Will Martin**, Co-Founder, UK Cladding Action Group

[Q1–38](#)

The Lord Porter of Spalding CBE, Fire and Building Safety Spokesman, Local Government Association (LGA); **Kate Henderson**, Chief Executive, National Housing Federation

[Q39–62](#)

Monday 8 March 2021

Lord Greenhalgh, Minister of State for Building Safety, Fire and Communities, Communities and Local Government; **Richard Goodman**, Director-General Building Safety, Grenfell & Net Zero, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government

[Q63–149](#)

List of Reports from the Committee during the current Parliament

All publications from the Committee are available on the [publications page](#) of the Committee's website.

Session 2019–21

Number	Title	Reference
1st	Protecting rough sleepers and renters: Interim Report	HC 309
2nd	Cladding: progress of remediation	HC 172
3rd	Building more social housing	HC 173
4th	Appointment of the Chair of Homes England	HC 821
5th	Pre-legislative scrutiny of the Building Safety Bill	HC 466
6th	Protecting the homeless and the private rented sector: MHCLG's response to Covid-19	HC 1329
1st Special	Government Response to the Committee's report on Protecting Rough Sleepers and Renters	CP 248
2nd Special	Cladding progress of remediation: Government response to the Select Committee report	CP 281
3rd Special	Building more social housing: Government response to the Select Committee Report	CP 299